Policy Brief: Remote Voting: Convenience at a Cost

Policy Brief: Remote Voting—Convenience at a Cost
‍
Executive Summary
Remote voting methods—mail-in ballots, vote centers, nursing home programs, and internet-based systems—expand
access but introduce serious vulnerabilities: vote harvesting, intimidation, chain-of-custody breakdowns, and
cybersecurity risks. Authoritative federal guidance classifies electronic ballot return as high risk; leading scientific
bodies caution that online voting cannot currently be made secure, secret, and verifiable. Policymakers should limit
third-party ballot collection, enforce chain of custody, prohibit internet voting and electronic ballot return, and require
hand-marked paper ballots with independent audits.

Key Vulnerabilities

1. ‍‍Vote Harvesting / Ballot Trafficking: Third-party collection weakens custody and exposes voters to
   coercion—particularly in long-term care settings.
2. Intimidation and Undue Influence: Remote environments seldom include bipartisan observers or trained
   poll workers.
3. Mail-In Vulnerabilities: Risks include mis-delivery, interception, and fraudulent ballot requests.
4. Electronic Ballot Return: Classified as high risk by CISA/EAC/FBI/NIST
5. Internet Voting: No known technology guarantees secrecy, security, and verifiability.
6. Vote Center Risks: Electronic poll books create dependency on networked systems vulnerable to denial-of-
   service and credential attacks. Centralized tabulation undermines distributed custody, amplifying the
   consequences of a single compromise. Ballot marking devices add complexity and reduce voter-verifiable
   integrity compared to hand-marked paper ballots.

Vote Centers vs. Precinct-Based Voting

• Vote Centers: Larger aggregated voter rolls, networked EPBs, centralized tabulation—one breach can
  affect thousands of votes.
• Precinct Model: Smaller, localized voter lists; poll workers know the community; distributed tabulation limits
  impact of tampering; paper backups ensure resilience.

Recommendations‍

• Prohibit electronic ballot return for general populations.
• Codify and enforce chain-of-custody standards.
• Limit third-party ballot collection.
• Require hand-marked paper ballots statewide with risk-limiting audits.
• Decentralize tabulation where feasible; require offline EPBs or robust contingency plans; mandate paper
  backups for voter check-in and tabulation.
• Protect voters in long-term care with supervised bipartisan mobile polling and strict non-interference policies.
• Remove network connectivity from tabulation environments; implement patch management and independent
  security testing.

Conclusion
Remote voting advances access—but convenience cannot outrun security. By enforcing custody, reducing attack
surfaces, and centering voters’ rights—especially for the most vulnerable—we can deliver elections that are both
accessible and trustworthy.

‍